International Crisis Group<\/p>\n
Latin America & Caribbean<\/p>\n
28 February 2019<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
What\u2019s new?<\/strong>\u2002Venezuelan crime syndicates and Colombian guerrilla groups are creating new threats across southern Venezuela as they compete for control of the region\u2019s valuable mineral resources. Tensions and violence have spiked in recent months, and could worsen in the midst of Venezuela\u2019s presidential crisis.<\/p>\n Why did it happen?<\/strong>\u2002The ongoing economic crisis has driven many impoverished Venezuelans into working in the illegal mining sector. Armed state and non-state actors, Colombian guerrillas foremost among them, have also expanded in this resource-rich region. Fast-declining oil production has turned gold mining into a vital source of revenue.<\/p>\n Why does it matter?<\/strong>\u2002The presence of organised crime and guerrilla groups harms communities, diverts scarce resources and prompts sky-high murder rates. Their expansion and cross-border operations, especially into Colombia, risk destabilising the entire region at a time of extreme uncertainty in Venezuela.<\/p>\n What should be done?<\/strong>\u2002Providing humanitarian care for affected populations, preserving communications between neighbouring armed forces, and restarting peace talks with rebels in Colombia are essential next steps. Sanctions targeting gold exports are counterproductive and should be abandoned in favour of stronger due diligence on mineral trading.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Far from Venezuela\u2019s centres of power where the fight to decide the country\u2019s political future is being waged, the vast tropical regions to the south are exposed to acute risks of intensifying conflict. Rich in gold and rare metals, Bol\u00edvar and Amazonas states have caught the eye of officials pressed to compensate for declining oil revenues and general economic collapse. At the same time, violent criminal groups have asserted control over mining communities, often in league with authorities. More recently, Colombian guerrillas and former rebels have crossed the Orinoco River to seize their share of the largely illegal mining industry. The riches and rebel proliferation in the south complicate prospects for a peaceful transition in Caracas by reinforcing military resistance to political change and stoking risks of cross-border violence and low-intensity warfare. Humanitarian attention for populations in the south, regular communication between neighbouring armed forces, renewed efforts to make peace with the guerrillas and cleaning up the gold trade will prove vital to easing tensions and protecting vulnerable Venezuelans.<\/p>\n Local, largely indigenous communities at the frontline of the spread of illegal mining and expansion of criminal or rebel groups now face the greatest hardships. Exposed to terror meted out by armed outfits seeking to enforce obedience, with homicide rates in some mining towns reaching extraordinary highs, these residents also face the effects on their health and environment from mercury spill-offs and a malaria epidemic. Extreme isolation and an oppressive state and security force presence silence many of these communities. These tensions surfaced on 23 February, when Venezuelan security forces killed at least three protesters and forced an indigenous mayor into exile during an attempt to bring humanitarian aid from Brazil.<\/p>\n Venezuela as a whole plunged into a deeper crisis on 23 January when, in the wake of presidential elections widely deemed unfair, National Assembly chairman Juan Guaid\u00f3 laid claim to the post of interim president. The U.S., Canada and several Latin American and European states endorsed the move, but incumbent Nicol\u00e1s Maduro is unlikely to relinquish power easily. In this already tense climate, entrenched financial interests and instability in the south could undermine the prospects of a peaceful change of leadership. Illegal mining profits are one of the armed forces\u2019 most coveted revenue streams; their desire to protect that income reinforces their loyalty to Maduro and gives the government an economic lifeline.<\/p>\n Armed groups exploiting the isolated terrain and limited government presence in the southern regions present other risks of violence. Cross-border movements of the Colombian guerrilla National Liberation Army (ELN) or dissident factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) operating in the mining regions could provoke a flare-up between Colombian and Venezuelan armed forces. Given the animosity between the two states and Venezuelan support for the ELN, Bogot\u00e1 may well perceive future ELN attacks on Colombian soil as a strike ordered by Caracas.<\/p>\n Should foreign forces intervene in Venezuela to depose Maduro at Guaid\u00f3\u2019s request, these rebel groups could be drawn to supporting the cause of the incumbent government and, in the very worst case, perpetuate a low-intensity conflict. At the same time, loyalties on the ground in southern Venezuela are volatile and unpredictable. Eyewitness testimonies point to regular collusion between non-state armed groups operating protection rackets in and around mines and officers from Venezuela\u2019s National Guard and regional military command. Former military and intelligence officers allege that complicity with these operations reaches the top ranks of the government and armed forces, where international gold sales from the \u201cMining Arc\u201d are coordinated. But factional rivalries plague all of these illicit relations. Last November, the ELN and National Guard engaged in a skirmish that killed four guardsmen. Fighting between the ELN and Venezuelan criminal groups, known as\u00a0sindicatos<\/em>, is also common, and has driven both groups closer to mining areas on the Guyanese border.<\/p>\n Awareness of the potential for worsening violent unrest in Bol\u00edvar and Amazonas should inform regional and international policy toward Venezuela, especially in the event of a change in leadership. Colombian and Venezuelan armed forces stationed on the frontier should acknowledge the grave risks that cross-border rebel movements pose to regional peace and preserve channels of communications to clarify suspect incidents and prevent skirmishes involving non-state armed groups from escalating. Although peace talks between the Colombian government and the ELN fell apart following the bombing of a police academy in Bogot\u00e1 in January that killed 22 people, Colombia should be ready to renew negotiations if signs emerge that the guerrillas are willing to embark on serious talks.<\/p>\n Outside powers and the Venezuelan opposition should also curb calls for a foreign military intervention in Venezuela, which only serve to galvanise these groups to fight foreign armies and protect their patrons within the Maduro government. Colombian authorities should entirely discount the possibility of a military incursion into Venezuela to strike the ELN given that it would expose civilians to even greater levels of violence.<\/p>\n Meanwhile, the south is in urgent need of humanitarian aid, as well as a major health assistance program aimed at containing its malaria epidemic. The gold mining industry, which sits at the heart of the region\u2019s health and environmental risks, as well as its profusion of armed groups, also merits a concerted international response. Sanctions on gold exports, as proposed last year by the U.S., would in all likelihood increase traffickers\u2019 control over the trade. Weaning gold away from the circuits of criminals and corrupt officials will instead require a gradual transformation of southern Venezuela\u2019s mining enclaves, based on the enforcement by OECD member states of international due diligence guidelines on gold and coltan trading.<\/p>\n The contest for the presidency in Venezuela has raised fears that the country could succumb to chaotic and violent disintegration. With no place more vulnerable to this fate than the southern regions, what happens in Bol\u00edvar and Amazonas constitutes an acid test of whether this deeply polarised country can exit its crisis in peace.<\/p>\nExecutive Summary<\/span><\/h1>\n
“Awareness of the potential for worsening violent unrest in Bol\u00edvar and Amazonas should inform regional and international policy toward Venezuela”<\/q><\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/div>\n
Bogot\u00e1\/Caracas\/Brussels, 28 February 2019<\/strong><\/h5>\n